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ABSTRACT
The siting of a linear facility connecting two or more
points (eg. transmission line, highway) involves two tasks:
(1) an efficient path must be selected based on the com-
bination of construction costs, local impact costs, and
other environmental costs; and (2) individuals along the
paths must be properly compensated for any adverse effects
the facility may cause them if local opposition to an
otherwise socially desirable facility is to be avoided.
Current siting processes have been limited by the difficulty
of assessing local impact costs which to a large extent
depend on the personal preferences of individual landowners.
This thesis develops a variation of an approach introduced
by O'Hare for creating a market for development rights
within which local costs are made explicit through the
competitive behavior of individual landowners. Each
landowner within a designated corridor is asked to specify
the amount of compensation he would require in order for
him to allow the facility to cross his land. This produces
a local impact cost function over the corridor that can
be used in conjunction with a construction cost function
and other environmental considerations to determine an
optimal path and the appropriate amount of compensation to
each of the landowners along that path. A case study of
the routing of a high voltage transmission line crossing
portions of Minnesota and North Dakota under the current
siting laws of those states is presented and an implementation
of this method in that context is discussed.
Name and Title of Thesis Supervisor: Michael O'Hare,
Associate Professor, Department of Urban Studies and Planning
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I. INTRODUCTION
An issue that has aroused concern in recent years
is increased local opposition to large facilities that
are socially beneficial but locally noxious (e.g. prisons,
power plants, waste treatment facilities, etc.). Many
local groups have successfully used delay tactics to
block or stall such projects, causing the society as a
whole to do without many important facilities.
Interest has been developing among researchers and
policymakers to find better ways ofresolving such conflicts.
One approach, suggested by O'Hare (77) involves the use of
an auction procedure to incorporate local concerns into
the site selection process. His proposal involves the
creation of a "market" for development rights in which
local communities offer to sell a developer the right to
locate in their towns in competition with other communities.
In this way the problem of local opposition is resolved
by allowing communities to determine the amount of compen-
sation they would require to accept such project. Further-
more, an appropriate level of the facility's social costs
would be defined and incorporated into the site selection
process.
This thesis will develop a variation of the auction
model for siting facilities which lie along a narrow
path connecting two designated points, such as transmission
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lines, highways, and pipelines. To make the discussion of
the issues more concrete, we will develop this model in
the context of the controversy surrounding the siting of
transmission lines in Minnesota and North Dakota. We
shall first examine the reasons for local opposition to
these facilities within the framework of the existing
siting processes in these States. Our focus will be on a
controversial 400KV transmission project that was recently
routed in the two states. In the second chapter we will
present a theoretical discussion of an auction process for
siting "linear" facilities. In the third chapter we
present a strategy for implementing that process for
transmission line siting in Minnesota and North Dakota,
and in the final chapter, we will discuss the market
approach to siting facilities from a planning perspective.
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II. AN ANALYSIS OF THE OPPOSITION TO TRANSMISSION FACILITIES
AND CURRENT STATE RESPONSES IN MINNESOTA AND NORTH DAKOTA
In Minnesota and North Dakota, one of the most
controversial issues in recent years has been the siting of
a high voltage transmission line across the two states.
Landowners from across the affected counties have consolidated
into various opposition groups to block the project. Some
want the project to be scrapped entirely, while others want
it to be rerouted to cross less productive agricultural
lands. The controversy began in the summer of 1974 when two
Minnesota utility cooperatives, the United Power Association
and the Cooperative Power Association (UPA/CPA), announced
a project that would transmit power from their mine-mouth
power plant in McLean County, North Dakota to Duluth,
Minnesota (approximately 427 miles). Since then numerous
public hearings have been held on the subject and the
siting authorities in both states have approved a specific
route for the line within their borders.
In Minnesota, the State's intervention so far seems
to have only hardened the resistence of the opposing
landowners. They angrily accused the state of failing to
address their concerns adequately in the siting process.
A year long delay with no end in sight has frustrated the
two utilities. Since December, 1976, a moratorium has been
imposed on all surveying work in Minnesota until the State's
4
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Supreme Court makes a decision on seven separate suits filed
against the utilities by opposition groups.
In North Dakota, the intensity of the opposition
subsided somewhat after the State designated a route, but
the compromise was not a satisfactory one to all of the
landowners. 2
There are two major aspects of the landowner's
opposition to UPA/CPA's transmission facility: the direct
adverse impacts transmission facilities have on landowners;
and the grievances the landowners have over the way their
concerns have been handled by the utilities and the state
in the site selection process.
A. Impacts from Transmission Facilities
1. Interference with Agricultural Activities. A
major problem landowners have with transmission facility
is its interference with agriculture, which is the leading
industry in both states. Ninety-five percent of the land
in Minnesota is cropland, 3-and ninety-seven percent of the
land in North Dakota is devoted to farming and ranching. 4
The towers and lines actually take very little land out of
production. Only those areas occupied by tower footings
are wholly removed from use. They generally do not exceed
.03 acres per tower with an average of four towers per
mile. Their presence, however, imposes a number of adverse
impacts upon the farming operations in fields along the route.
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First, irrigation operations are vulnerable to the
routing of transmission lines. An irrigation system widely
used in these two states is the center-pivot sprinkler
system which can effectively irrigate a quarter section of
land (131 acres) at a time.6 A tower anywhere in the quarter
section other than in the four corners would prevent center-
pivot irrigation. This problem is of concern to landowners
with irrigated field as well as those whose fields have
the potential of being irrigated in the future. Drier
weather in recent years has caused -a trend toward the
installation of such systems. Irrigation in North Dakota
increased by 18% between 1974-1975, and forecasts by county
soil conservation specialists and Agricultural Cooperative
Extension personnel indicate that this trend will continue
over the next few years.7
Second, many large scale farm machines such as combines
are not easily manuvered around the towers. Bill Michelson
Jr., a North Dakota farmer who copes with nine towers in his
field describes the problem in this way:
"In the first place, you've got to be very careful
when you are swathing so that you go around the tower from
the right direction or the combine can not get that close
on account of the grain auger. It does not always work out
that you are going the right direction with the swather so
you have to turn short and go around to the other side of
the tower. This means you leave some grain and then the
next round you have to run over some which you have already
cut. So there is always some waste each and every year."8
Besides the waste and the additional work, manuvering
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machines near towers tends to increase the rate at which
machines breakdown due to accidental hits with tower legs.
Third, the presence of lines and towers may interfere
with aerial spraying, which is used extensively in Minnesota
and North Dakota for seeding, fertilizing, controlling weeds,
and treating plant diseases. A pilot can usually cope with
the presence of a single line, but his task becomes very
dangerous or even impossible if additional obstacles such
as shelterbelts and distribution lines are in close proximity
to the transmission line. In addition, he may have some
difficulty judging the location of the lines if they are
aligned diagonally across a field.
2. Other Impacts. Visual and noise impacts, health
and safety concerns, and radio and television interference
are also associated with high voltage transmission lines.
However, they have not played a major role in the controversy
in Minnesota and North Dakota yet.
B. The Inability of Landowners to Influence The Site
Selection Process
The direct impacts from transmission lines are serious
problems for landowners, but to many, the more irritating
problem has to do with the way they have been dealt with
during the siting of transmission lines. Harold Hagen,
president of a prominent local opposition group, has said
that his group is not opposed to electricity, but they are
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opposed to the procedures used by the utilities.9
In both states, utilities have been granted the
State's power of eminent domain to acquire transmission
easements from unwilling landowners. Landowners have
little recourse other than to dispute the amount of
compensation paid for the easement, taking the company to
court when the two parties cannot reach an agreement.
Landowners in Minnesota and North Dakota, who have
traditionally placed a high value on their right to control
the use of their property, have attempted to chip away at
the utilities' eminent domain power. In 1976, a group of
landowners in Burleigh Countyi North Dakota asked a district
court to deny a utility the power of eminent domain on the
grounds that it existed solely to transmit power out-of-state,
therefore did not serve any public purpose in North Dakota.
The district court affirmed their contention, but the decision
was later overturned by the North Dakota Supreme Court.10
State legislation recently passed in the two states,
however, did restrict a utility's use of eminent domain to
state approved routes, and provisions were made to give
affected landowners a greater voice in routing decisions
through public hearings and citizen advisory committees.
To analyze the effects the siting legislation has had
on the opposition problem, we will first examine the
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procedures of the siting process as it is stated in each
State's siting legislation, then we will examine how the
controversial UPA/CPA project was routed under the two
siting laws and how the process was viewed by landowners
opposed to the project.
1. The Current Siting Process in Minnesota and North
Dakota. The Minnesota legislature passed the State's
Power Plant Siting and Transmission Line Routing Act in
1973, and placed its administration under the Minnesota
Environmental Quality Council (MEQC) .
A two-tier review process was established for the
routing of transmission lines. The Council first approves
a general corridor for the line, whose width may be variable
up to approximately 19 miles. The Council then designates
a specific route within the corridor. Route width may be up
to one kilometer which still leaves the utility some
choices in the actual right-of-way. In both processes, the
Council is given 180 days to issue a permit after the
receipt of an application, and its decision supersedes and
preempts all local regulations.
In the corridor review process, the Council evaluates
alternative corridors in light of their construction cost
considerations, their impacts on local landowners and
environmental interests. It may appoint a corridor
evaluation committee to help assess the various alternatives.
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Committee members, who are appointed by the Council, must
include at least one representative from a public or
municipally owned utility, a cooperatively owned utility,
a regional council, and each of the county and municipal
corporations in which the transmission line corridor is to
be located. A committee of similar composition must be
appointed during the route selection process.
The siting legislation and the rules and regulations
subsequently issued by MEQC did not specify any criteria for
the selection of a route within the corridor.
The Act also provided that all of the state agencies
which are authorized to issue permits for the construction
and operation of high voltage transmission lines shall
participate in the public hearing process by clarifying
whether the proposed corridors and routes will be in
compliance with their own rules and regulations. This
helps to ensure coordinated action among state agencies
who have separate responsibilities for the same project.
The siting act also gave the MEQC the authority to
develop an inventory of potential sites for power plants
and transmission line corridors. The MEQC has refrained
from doing this, however, arguing that it would result
in a finite number of sites based on very inflexible
criteria. Besides, as a practical matter, the State did
not have and could not afford the financial and technical
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resources needed to develop such an inventory. Instead,
the Council prepared an inventory designating "exclusion
areas" and "avoidance areas". A transmission line is not
allowed to pass through an exclusion area under any
conditions, and passage through an avoidance area is permitted
only if it can be shown to the Council's satisfaction that
there are no reasonable alternatives. Exclusion areas
include national and state wilderness areas, areas in which
the presence of a line would violate federal and state agency
regulations, and any other area designated as "exclusionery"
by the Council. Avoidance areas consist of areas with valued
historical or natural features, including national and state
parks, national monuments, wildlife refuge areas, and county
and city parks.
Activities of the Council aze financed from an annual
assessment made by the Council against the utility.
North Dakota passed its siting act in 1975 and
charged the Public Service Commission with its adminis-
tration (PSC).12 There are only a few differences from
Minnesota's law (which served as its model).
First, the North Dakota siting law places different
constraints on the size of the area that has to be examined
in designating a corridor or a route. It limits the width of
a corridor to between one and six miles, and the width of a
route to coincide with the right-of-way required by a
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transmission line.
Second, North Dakota has developed more restrictive
criteria for designating "exclusion" and "avoidance"
areas. It placed some of the sites designated as avoidance
areas by MEQC under the exclusionery category. Furthermore,
it included in its avoidance category a number of areas that
were not included by MEQC such as woodland and irrigated
land.
Third, although the PSC is given the authority to
appoint an advisory committee composed of citizens from the
affected area and representatives from utilities and state
agencies, it is not required to do so at any stage of the
review process.
2. The Siting of UPA/CPA's High Voltage Transmission
Line. To date, the UPA/CPA line is the only major transmission
project that has been routed under the 1973 Minnesota
siting law. Planning for the 400KV DC line began several
years before the siting law was enacted and the two utilities
could have argued for its exemption from the law. But they
opted to have the route designated under the siting law
because of the threat of intense local opposition and
potential problems with county zoning regulations.1 3
The line will transmit power from the Cooperatives' mine-
mouth power plant in McLean County, North Dakota to Duluth,
Minnesota. The proposed right-of-way is 160 feet wide and
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approximately 427 miles long, 172 miles in Minnesota and
255 miles in North Dakota. Typical land uses in the
region crossed by the proposed route include cropland,
pastureland, and native rangeland. The UPA/CPA estimated
that the total land area that will be taken out of production
due to the placement of towers would be 49 acres. 1 4
The utilities submitted an application for a corridor
in April 1975, which included preliminary engineering,
environmental, and cost analyses for its preferred and
alternate corridors. The MEQC staff recommended three
other corridors for consideration. The Corridor Selection
Committee recommended a substantially different corridor
that crossed less productive agricultural land.1 5
During July and August of that year, eleven public
hearings were held in counties where the various corridors
were proposed. A number of citizen groups participated
extensively in the hearings, including "Counties United
for Rural Environment", "Keep Towers Out", "No Power
Lines", "Concerned Douglas Citizens", and several irrigation
associations. Representatives from environmental and
public interest groups were also present.
After considering all of the evidence and data presented
by the utilities, landowner groups, and state agencies,
the hearing officer recommended the UPA/CPA preferred
corridor to the MEQC, stating that the estimated benefits
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of the other corridors could not justify their increased
construction costs. His recommendation was adopted by the
Council on October 3, 1975 (see Map I).
Following the corridor designation, UPA/CPA filed an
application for a construction permit for a specific
route within the designated corridor. The proposed route.
basically followed a straight line between the two terminal
points, crossing many stretches of prime cropland diagonally.
Several alternative routes were proposed by MEQC's siting
staff and the Citizen Route Evaluation Committee. Again
public hearings were held in the affected areas to hear the
concerns and preferences of landowners.
The final route selected by MEQC generally follows
the UPA/CPA preferred route, but made some deviations in
the central Minnesota section. A series of diagonal
crossings were revised to go along field edges and
property lines. In addition to routing alterations,
MEQC increased the ground clearance for conductors over
cropland from 35 to 50 feet.16
The construction permit for the route was issued in
MEQC's meeting on June 3, 1976. Approximately 200 people
from the affected counties went to that meeting, most as
participants of their local protest groups. Spokesmen
were appointed to present their positions to the MEQC.
Throughout the meeting, the crowd noisely disapproved of
Source: The Minnesota Environmental Quality Council
St. Paul, Minnesota
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remarks made by the NEQC. After the meeting, over 50
of them marched angrily to the adjoining capitol building,
threatening to fight before permitting surveyors and
construction workers on their land.17
Anthropologist Luther Gerlach observed that including
citizen participation in MEQC's routing process seems to
have increased the differences between opposing interests.
In particular, the process of presenting testimony and
cross-examining witnesses during the public hearings
tended to increase the antagonism.18
Landowners had many grievances against the review
process. Some were bitter that their participation did
not result in major route changes. They felt that their
participation only served to legitimize MEQC's actions.
Others complained about the fact easement compensation is
still determined by utilities. Under the siting law, once
a route has been given the State's blessing, the utility can
proceed with construction by paying a set amount to
landowners crossed by the route. Even through the amount
of compensation offered by UPA/CPA was record high (see
Table I, many landowners were not satisfied. Virgil
Fuchs, a landowner whose farm lies along the approved
route, said: "If they (utilities) have to give farmers
the true value of the land, this wouldn't be the cheapest
way anymore." 1 9 As of December, 1976, the utilities had
-17-
Table I
STANDARD EASEMENT FEES PAID TO
LANDOWNERS FOR THE UPA/CPA PROJECT, 1976
tillable, tillable,
parallel diagonal
untillable alignment alignment
payment per tower $1,000 $2,000 $3,000
payment per mile $1,000 $3,000 $3,000
of overhang
total payment* $5,000 $11,000 $15,000
per mile
The average tower spacing is four per mile.
SOURCES: McConnon, Dan, United Power Association, Environmental
and Safety Division, March, 1977.
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only obtained 23% of all the easements it needed.20
Frustrated by their lack of power to affect changes,
many landowners resorted to harrassing utility employees
to block the line's construction. They milled about in
front of the surveyors, carried signs to block their view,
and interfered with walkie-talkie communication by running
chain saws and tractors. On a few occasions, tempers ran
short and scuffles broke out. The Meeker County District
Court refused the landowners' request to halt the power
line survey and enjoined them from interfering with
surveyors. However, neither county or state officials
wanted the responsibility of enforcing the Court's order.2 1
To prevent an incident, a moratorium has since been
imposed on further surveying work until the Minnesota
State Supreme Court makes a decision on a case consolidating
seven separate suits filed against the utilities. All of
the suits were filed by local groups attempting to halt
surveying activities. An attorney representing the land-
owners argued that a confrontation between the landowners
and surveyors would.be explosive, and such confrontations
would violate the landowner's civil constitutional rights
to an equal protection under the law. 22
The UPA/CPA line is also the first to be routed under
the North Dakota siting law. The PSC issued an order
taking jurisdiction of the line on March 6, 1976. Since
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by that time the utilities had already obtained more than
70% of the easements they needed in North Dakota, the PSC
decided to accept their proposed corridor without holding
hearings or checking into alternative corridors. It also
decided to route the line within all easements acquired so
long as they did not violate the facility routing criteria
formulated by the Commission.23 These decisions were
challinged by the County Association for Rural Environment
(CARE) as being "'contrary to the law", but the court ruled
against the CARE.24
Fifteen days of public hearings on UPA/CPA's route
permit-application were held, producing more than two
thousand pages of testimony from a hundred witnesses.
The majority were landowners who owned land along the
route. Most of their suggestions' concerned the placement
of power lines along section or quarter section lines
rather than diagonally across fields, and the elimination
of towers from cropland and potentially irrigable land.
In some cases, the affected landowners presented an alternate
route to the PSC. In general, the hearings went smoothly
and seemed to have resulted in some constructive exchanges
between landowners and UPA/CPA representatives. Some
landowners stated after the hearings that they appreciated
the opportunity to speak their piece, even if it did not
lead to a favorable change.25
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The PSC designated route followed the utilities'
preferred route, but included a number of adjustments
which steered the structures away from cropland and
potentially irrigable fields. Later, CARE and several
individual landowners in Richland and Sargent counties
petitioned for a relocation of the route in that area.
The petition was denied by the PSC.
By and large, although private grumbling among North
Dakota landowners has continued after PSC's designation,
organized opposition to the line has dissipated. It
should be noted that the intensity of the opposition in
North Dakota was never at the.same level as it was in
Minnesota.
3. An Analysis of State Responses. The two
states have nearly identical route selection processes,
yet the success each had in handling the UPA/CPA case was
quite different. In Minnesota, the process seems to have
intensified the opposition, while in North Dakota the
process led to some constructive compromises between the
opposing groups even though opposition was not completely
eliminated. One possible reason for this is simply that
Minnesotan landowners are more strongly opposed to tran-
smission lines. Another important consideration is that
in North Dakota, the public hearing process focused on
only local adjustments to an already established route,
-21-
since the utility had obtained most of the easements it
needed when the line came under the jurisdiction of PSC.
Thus the negotiations were about very concrete issues
concerning individual landowners and the dialogue between
them and the energy companies was reasonably productive.
In Minnesota, on the other hand, the MEQC had to choose a
corridor and then a route within it. Making an acceptable
decision in these cases involved finding a route that is
sensitive to the utilities' costs and agreeable to the
landowners along it. The public hearing process is
poorly suited for this task. While it can make small
incremental changes in a route in responses to complaints
from individuals (as was the case in North Dakota), it
cannot anticipate the local reaction to a given route and
it has no effective way of choosing one route over another
in a manner acceptable to the different groups of landowners
along those paths. Consequently, MEQC had no way of
improving the situation for the impacted landowners since
any global change to the route makes a different set of
landowners unhappy.-
In the next section, we will introduce a market
approach to siting transmission lines which will address
this problem.
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III. A MARKET APPROACH TO SITING LINEAR FACILITIES
In this chapter we will discuss an approach to
siting a linear facility that has two principal objec-
tives: (1) to select the most efficient route in
terms of the combined costs to the developer and the
landowners, and (2) to reduce or eliminate local opposi-
tion by giving landowners increased control over the use
of their land and the compensation they are paid. In
essence, the approach involves the creation of a market
for development rights in which landowners in competi-
tion with their neighbors sell a developer the right to
cross their land.
A. Selecting an Optimal Route
Figure 1 shows an example of a path P connecting
two points through a corridor C. The total cost to soci-
ety of constructing a facility along this path can be
decomposed into three components: its construction cost,
local impact costs, and environmental costs. The construc-
tion and local impact costs of a facility have the nice
property that they can usually be expressed conveniently
in terms of cost per unit length at a given location. For
example the construction cost per mile of a high voltage
transmission line is much higher over heavily forested
terrain than it is over open range land with good access
roads. Similarly, the lacal impact cost of a transmission
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line is much higher over farmland where center-pivot
irrigation is used than it is over pasture land. In
addition, the local impact cost per mile of transmission
line depends on the personal preferences of the individual
who owns the land it crosses. The environmental costs of
the facility along the path P are all. the other non-
local costs due to the facility. These shall not be
addressed in this paper.
Given a corridor C and a specific facility X, the
local nature of the construction and local impact costs
makes it possible to define two cost functions f and g
over the corridor C. For each location s in the corridor:
f(s) is the cost of constructing a unit length of
the facility X at location s.
g(s) is the local impact cost due to a unit length
of the facility X at location s.
In these terms, the combined construction and local
impact cost of a facility X constructed along a path P
through corridor C is:
path-cost(P) =S[f(s) + g(s)] dl
P
which is the line integral along the path P of the combined
corridor cost function f and g.
It is convenient to view the corridor C as a grid
of many small parcels of land so that the functions f
and g can be treated as constants over each of them
-24-
b
Figure 1. A path (solid line) is shown connecting the
pointsi' a and b through a corridor (grid pattern).
Figure 2. This enlarged view of a portion of figure 1 shows
how the grid partitions the path into segments (Pi). If
each grid square is small enough, the local impact cost and
construction cost associated with a unit length of the
facility will be essentially the same no matter where it lies
within the square. Thus the combined cost for the segment P
can be expressed as [f (si) + g (si) ] x [length of P where s
is the center of the square.
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(see Figure 2). These parcels could correspond to
individually owned lots of land or they could be smaller
if there are construction and impact cost differences
within an individual's land. This grid breaks a path P
into many segments P contained in a sequence of grid
squares which we shall identify by their centers s. so
that:
n
path-cost(P) = [f(s ) + g(s )] x [length of P.]
There are infinitely many paths P through the
corridor C connecting points a and b, of which the most
interesting path is the one that costs the least. We
shall refer to this as P and it obviously depends
optimal
on the functions f and g. Poptimal can be determined
in a straight forward manner -using a computer provided
that the cost functions f and g are known. Companies
cna often determine the construction cost function f
adequately, but unfortunately the local impact function
cannot be specified easily because it depends on individual
preferences which can be very imprecisely expressed when
solicited from landowners as opinions.
B. Local Opposition
In current facility siting practice, a developer
must commit himself to a particular path and then attempt
to acquire the development rights to the land crossed by
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that path. This gives landowners a great deal of market
power, especially after a significant proportion of the
land has already been acquired. In response to this
problem, developers have been motivated to begin acquiring
land covertly well in advance of construction, and for
projects of value to the state, they have been granted
the power of eminent domain.
Such practices, especially the use of eminent domain,
are distasteful to landowners along the facility's path for
three reasons: (1) the developer is motivated to under-
estimate the real cost to the landowner, (2) the eminent
domain process is insensitive to the less tangible local
impact costs such as personal preferences, and (3) the
use of eminent domain severely limits a landowner's
ability to control the use of his land. The combination
of these problems creates resentment among many impacted
landowners and opposition to the project from them is
common and often resolute.
C. An Auction Scheme For Linear Facilities
O'Hare has considered similar problems associated
with the siting of facilities such as power plants-and
prisons, and has demonstrated that: (1) in order to put
such facilities in the right place and overcome local
opposition, it is strategically important to compensate
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those communities that are adversely affected by the
project, and (2) the correct amount of compensation can
be determined through an auction process in which designated
communities bid, in competition with each other, the amount
of compensation they would require in order to accept
the facility. The location promising the lowest sum of
construction and compensation costs will be selected.
The important characteristic of O'Hare's scheme is
that a facility's impact costs are determined by allowing
communities to (offer to) trade its impacts for money
in a market situation. The same principle can be applied
to siting linear facilities with more elegance and
equity than is possible for point facilities (e.g. prisons).
In this case, the auction is used to derive the local
impact cost function, g, by asking each landowner in the
corridor to make a binding bid in terms of the amount of
compensation per unit length of the facility that would be
required for him to agree to having it cross his land.
This cost function would then be used in conjunction with
the facility's construction cost function to select an
optimal path through the corridor, and to compensate
landowners.
The key assumption behind this approach is that the
landowners will submit bids very close to the true cost
of the facility to them. It is motivated by the following
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considerations:
(1) a rational landowner will not submit a bid that
is lower than the facility's cost to him, provided that
he has the ability to estimate that cost accurately, and
(2) a rational landowner will not submit a bid very
much higher than the facility's cost to him, provided
that he is in competition with other landowners.
In the following sections, we shall discuss the
major issues affecting the validity of these considerations.
D. Corridor Selection
In the basic auction scheme described above, no
restrictions on the domain of the cost functions were
considered. In practice, the width of the corridor that
constitutes the domain of the impact and construction
cost functions will be limited; thus the optimal path
selected is very dependent on the particular corridor
used.
There are several sources of constraints on the
width of the corridor. First, there are three constraints
associated with the development of the local impact cost
function: (1) the corridor should be wide enough so the
auction process appears fair, (2) the corridor width should
not go beyond the point where the administrative cost of
obtaining more bids exceed the expected benefits of having
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more alternatives, and (3) the corridor should be narrow
enough to give landowners who want the facility a reasonable
chance of getting it; if it is too wide, his willingness
to invest his time and money in preparing a bid would be
reduced. Second, the cost of preparing the construction
cost function may also limit the width of the corridor,
especially for projects that require extensive geological
or other site-specific studies. Third, if the auction
method is used within an existing siting process, there
may be corridor width limitations imposed by it.
Because its width is limited, the particular route the
corridor takes is important and must be determined based
on construction, local impact, and environmental cost
considerations. While it may not be possible to develop
precise cost functions for each of these on a large scale,
rough estimates can usually be made that are useful for
incorporating the State's various concerns into the
corridor selection process. The exclusion and avoidance
zones used by Minnesota and North Dakota is an example of
how the state can incorporate estimates of local impact
and environmental costs into the corridor selection
process.
.E. Market Power
In principle, the bids would be near the true impact
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cost of the facility to the landowners since they are
submitted in a competitive situation. However, this may
not be the case for all the landowners in the corridor
either because a portion of the corridor is very narrow,
or because a group of landowners across some portion of
the corridor have agreed among themselves not to compete.'
In such cases, those individuals with market power could
extract a substantial profit over and above the true cost
of the facility to them, draining much of the facility's
benefits.
A major difficulty in dealing with this type of
problem lies in distinguishing artificially high bids
from bids that reflect real impact costs. For this
reason, the most effective policy is to widen the corridor
locally to include more competitors near regions where
the average bids submitted are significantly higher than
the average for the whole corridor, allowing all the
landowners there to submit new bids (if they want to).
If this is possible (sometimes construction or environ-
mental considerations will prohibit this), the coalition,
if there was one, is likely to be. broken or weakened
since the desirability of a coalition over bidding
individually diminishes as the number of landowners sharing
the profit increases., If there was no coalition, nothing
is lost, and the likelihood of finding a route that
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causes less impact is increased.
If the corridor cannot be widened sufficiently, the
only remaining recourse is to fall back on the use of
eminent domain. However, the problem of distinguishing
artificially high bids from high bids due to real impacts
remains. Perhaps the best compromise is to set a very
generous threshold (several times higher than the easement
fees currently paid) on the bids that would be accepted
and use eminent domain, paying the threshold value, in
cases where the bid was higher. This strategy would
protect most landowners while limiting the size of the
profits that could be taken by individuals possessing
market power.
F. Information Requirements.
In order to have an effective market process, each
landowner in the corridor must be able to make a bid that
is consistent with his interests. To do this, he must have
an accurate understanding of how the facility will affect
him, and he must be familiar with the way this market
works.
Fortunately, impacts from linear facilities are
usually confined to the region near their sites, so each
landowner only has to consider the impacts from that
portion of the facility which crosses his land. This
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means that the amount of information a landowner has to
deal with is a lot less than what a more centralized
organization would have to deal with if it had to evaluate
the facility's overall impact. In addition, so long as
he understands the objective characteristics of the
facility, a landowner is probably in a better position
to assess its local impacts than anyone else since the
severity of the impacts is largely dependent on the way
he uses (or intends to use) his land and on his personal
preferences.
However, this is a new responsibility for the land-
owner and he may require information and technical support
in making a decision. The developer would be eager to
provide information to counter local misconceptions about
the facility, but he would also be motivated to downplay
its drawbacks. The state is a more credible source of
information, but if it does not have the proper technical
resources or funds allocated for this purpose, the
landowners themselves will have the responsibility of
obtaining the information they need. If an appropriate
landowner's organization exists or can be established,
they could pool their resources to hire consultants and to
seek additional funding from the state and the developer to
support their effort.
Each landowner must also understand the~way the
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development rights market works if he is to compete
effectively in it. In particular, he must know whether
there is an upper bound on the size of his bid; that is
can he expect any bid he submits to be respected (the use
of eminent domain is eliminated) or is there a threshold
above which the developer will override his bid in favor
of using eminent domain. If there is a threshold, the
auction process will only be meaningful to those landowners
whose true impact costs are below it. The landowner must
also know what the implications of not submitting a bid.
If eminent domain cannot be used by the developer, then
the landowner should understand that no bid implies that
he does not want the facility. If there is a threshold,
then no bid implies that his land will only be used
through eminent domain, and so his "default" bid is the
value of the threshold.
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IV. A SCHEME FOR USING THE AUCTION IDEA TO FACILITATE THE
SITING OF TRANSMISSION LINES IN MINNESOTA AND NORTH
DAKOTA
The auction concept for siting linear facilities is
particularly well-suited for the transmission line siting
problem in Minnesota and North Dakota for the following
reasons:
(1) The impacts generated by these facilities are
generally confined to their sites and affect only those
landowners on whose land it lies, so the facility's
local impact costs are much more significant than its
"environmental" or non-local impact costs.
(2) The local impacts of transmission facilities
are tangible and landowners are generally technically
competent in estimating the facility's cost to them.
Furthermore, there's little unknown or unpredictable
risk with which bidders must deal.
(3) There are many local landowner's organization such
as the Farmer's Union and irrigation associations which can
help the landowner with his information requirements.
(4) The relative homogeneity of the land use in
that.area simplifies issues around three well-defined
groups: the farmers, the developer, and the state.
The auction idea, however, is untested and it would
have the best chance of being used if it could be implemented
conservatively with a minimum of change to the State's
Mv I.V
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existing siting process. One possibility is for the state
to simply raise the minimum eminent domain fee significantly,
setting a threshold as discussed in the previous chapter
in order to motivate developers to use the auction idea
themselves, within the state's existing siting process.
The feasibility of this scheme hinges on the following
questions: (1) Can a company .solicit binding bids from
landowners without the backing of state law, and (2) can
it do this within the confines of the existing facility
siting process. In the following sections, we shall attempt
to show that these questions can be answered affirmatively
and then we shall examine the resulting implementation
proposal from the perspectives of each of the interested
parties.
A. Conditional Easement Contracts
One approach that can be used to ensure that the bids
solicited from landowners are binding is to have them
made in the form of a contractual agreement between the
developer and the landowner. The landowner would decide
on the amount of compensation he would require and would
sign an agreement stating that the company could have the
easement to cross his land provided it paid him that
.amount (within a given period of time). Such an agreement
would be the same as the easement contracts currently
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used by companies except that (1) the compensation would
be determined by the landowner rather than the company,
and (2) the landowner would sign it first and return it to
the company for its consideration. In this way, the
company can develop it's cost functions for the corridor
with.the confidence that it could acquire the easements
it needed, for any route selected, without opposition by
completing the corresponding contracts. It is important
to note that a landowner is not obligated to sign such
an agreement any more than he is currently obligated to
sign easement agreements with a company. Similarly, the
company is not obligated to use the contract submitted
by the landowners. It could still negotiate for a lower
price or use eminent domain at the new threshold price
set by the state.
There is one important difference between the ease-
ment contracts currently used and this proposal. In the
former, the right-of-way required for the facility can be
precisely specified while in this case, it cannot. This
distinction can be reflected in the proposed contract in
several ways. The simplest would be to ask the landowner
for a bid to cover all possibilities, but that would lead
to excessively large bids. Another would be to have the
landowner submit a number of bids for several specific
right-of-ways (for example, one following section lines
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along his property and another for a specific diagonal
crossing). However, this would limit the number of paths
that could be considered. A third approach would be to
subdivide his land into smaller parcels (possibly 330' x
330'1, which he could bid on individually in recognition
of the fact that it is not the direction of the line so
much as what parts of his land that it crosses that is
important to landowners. This latter approach would
also be most convenient for setting up the cost function.
B. Using The Proposed Method within The Existing State
Siting Process
A-company could use this approach to prepare a route
application after the state has approved a corridor for the
line. The state's focus during the route review process
has been to ensure that the route selected from within
the corridor is acceptable to the company, landowners, and
other state concerns. By using the auction method, the
company can make a strong case to the state that it has
selected the most efficient route in terms of the combined
costs to the company and the landowners. Furthermore, if
it is prepared to pay the bids, it has the approval of
most or all of the landowners along the route. Should the
state reject a portion of the proposed route, the company
can simply adjust its cost function to reflect the new
situation and compute the new optimal route.
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C. The Company's Perspective
The major benefit the company would receive from this
implementation would be a reduction in losses due to delays
caused by local opposition. The United Power Association
estimated that the construction of the 400 KV UPA/CPA line
has been delayed a year by opposing landowners, costing
the company approximately $60 million which is roughly
equivalent to the line's total construction cost and ten
times the compensation that would be paid if the currently
highest eminent domain fee was used ($15,000 per mile for
crossing tillable land diagonally) for the entire length
of the line.26
The risk the company is forced to take is the higher
threshold easement fee. While the auction process promises
significantly lower compensation bids along the optimal
path, in the worst case where all the landowners bid the
threshold value, the total compensation cost paid by the
company could be several times the amount currently paid.
D. The Landowner's Perspective
The benefit to landowners is obvious. They would have
greater influence over the compensation they are paid and
over the path selected by the company. Intertwined with
this new power is the new responsibility of assessing
impacts and making bids. Each landowner would have to
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decide just what a transmission line would cost him in
order to make a bid that would be to his advantage. The
state may or may not provide information or technical
assistance to the landowners for this purpose. However,
it should be noted that in past transmission line siting
cases, the officials presiding over public hearings
were impressed by the knowledge many landowners had of the
subject. In the public hearing on the UPA/CPA project,
for example, it was the landowners who brought many impact
issues to the states' attention.
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V. DISCUSSION
From a planning perspective, the key issues in
evaluating this proposal are efficiency, equity, and
implementability. We will compare the proposed auction
method to current siting practices in these terms.
The proposed method should increase the efficiency
of the siting process in two ways. First, the path
selection is based on more complete cost information.
In the current process only very coarse local impact
information is available when the route is chosen and so
it is based largely on construction cost considerations.
The auction method will add much more precise local
impact information over the entire corridor so that a
better path can be determined. Second, by compensating
landowners according to their perceived costs, construction
delays due to local opposition can be avoided, further
reducing costs to society.
The principal change affecting equity introduced
by the auction method is the shift from defining local
impact costs in terms of disruptions to the existing
land use (eg.how much will agricultural production be
reduced by the facility) to a broader definition that
includes the less tangible costs experienced by the
affected landowners. Given that the auction method can
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determine these costs reliably, the local adverse
effects created by a facility can be compensated for by
an appropriate adjustment to the distribution of its
benefits. (Should the required compensation exceed the
benefits, the project could not be justified in terms
of the net benefit it produces).
The most difficult issue raised by the auction
approach is that it introduces a landowner's economic
status into the measurement of the facility's impact
on him. One can argue quite successfully that the
process is fair since each bidder decides for himself
the price of the development right he is selling, just
as he would buy or sell anything else. However, it can
also be argued that the effect of noise and air pollution
from a nearby highway on an individual's health and well-
being has nothing to do with his economic status. The
pain a man may suffer, a priori, does not depend on his
wealth although the price at which he will be willing
to tolerate it does. The challenge to the planner is
to decide which of these views leads to a more equitable
assessment of a facility's cost to.society.
There are two considerations that have been raised
concerning the proposal's implementability. The first
is the potential opposition from developers who would be
forced to pay substantially higher compensations when using
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their eminent domain power. This opposition will be
reduced only if it can be demonstrated convincingly that
the increase in the combined construction and compensation
costs of the facility will be smaller than the expected
losses due to local opposition under the current process.
The second consideration is the acceptability of the ,
auction method to landowners. While they stand to gain
significantly from the change, some may be ideologically
opposed to the idea of trading certain impacts in a
market. If only a small percentage of the landowners
feel this way, the process will not be hurt significantly
by their non-participation. However if many hold this
opinion, it would be meaningless to attempt to use the
auction process without first persuading them to parti-
cipate.
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